B
y 1994 all major industrialized nations, including the United States, had ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), yet 15 years later policymakers still debate how best to formulate emissions legislation. Article 2 of the UNFCCC calls for ''stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations . . . at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.'' Emissions targets are commonly quoted as a percentage reduction relative to a baseline year. A different framework for emissions targets is presented in a recent issue of PNAS (1) , wherein the targets are set as a cumulative emissions inventory, spelling out to policymakers the net emissions allowable to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.
Setting emissions targets around a net cumulative quota is a familiar paradigm for policymakers. It is analogous to planning for expenditure against a net income or setting a catch quota to maintain a sustainable fishery. In such cases, the available resource is fundamentally limited in a cumulative sense; harvest or spend too much and things become unsustainable. For the global harvesting of fossil fuels the message becomes clear: burn beyond a cumulative cap and you commit the planet to a high risk of dangerous anthropogenic climate change.
The article by Zickfeld et al.
(1) uses a coupled climate model to carefully diagnose, via inverse methods, the level of emissions allowable to track toward a given stabilization target for global warming. Normally, the problem is addressed in reverse: namely, for a given future emission pathway (2), how will the climate system respond? Both approaches are valid, yet to make meaningful projections they each need to carefully incorporate coupled carbon feedbacks.
Carbon feedbacks occur when there are climate-induced changes in the net fluxes of carbon between the land/ocean and the atmosphere. The strength of the feedback depends on the scale of physical climate change and biophysical processes in the ocean and land systems. A simple example of an ocean carbon feedback is caused by the solubility of CO 2 , which varies inversely with temperature. Ocean warming reduces the capacity of seawater to dissolve CO 2 , which weakens the solubility pump as the planet warms (3). Carbon feedbacks are particularly uncertain for the terrestrial biosphere (4, 5) , with changes in atmospheric quantities directly affecting vegetation type, properties, and physiological function. These can then affect land carbon uptake via both positive and negative feedbacks (4) .
The anthropogenic carbon stored in the oceans and terrestrial biosphere has acted as a tremendous buffer of climate change to date; these systems have absorbed more than half of our industrial emissions (6) . Yet the ability of these stores to sequester carbon is changing over time. Fifty years ago natural carbon sinks removed Ϸ600 kg of every ton of CO 2 emitted to the atmosphere. Today, these sinks remove only Ϸ550 kg per ton emitted (6) , and this amount is expected to continue to fall (3, 4) . There are also risks of abrupt change in the terrestrial carbon sink; for example, climate change could trigger Amazon forest die-back (7), and permafrost melt could expose northern peatlands to large releases of carbon (8), both resulting in strong positive feedbacks. In short, the carbon sinks that have served us so well are by no means stable: they are changing and, unfortunately, changing in the wrong sense. Add to this land clearing and the associated release of CO 2 and loss of natural carbon storage (9) , and the combined land-ocean sink is showing diminishing returns in time.
Carbon feedbacks can thus greatly reduce the allowable emissions to stabilize at some policy-prescribed target. Yet these feedbacks are generally not incorporated into future climate projections. By doing an inverse calculation within their model, Zickfeld et al. (1) are able to progressively track an emissions pathway that leads to a given stabilization target for global warming, while also incorporating carbon feedbacks. This approach differs from the conventional methodology in that they (i) use an inverse method working back from a given temperature target to quantify the allowable CO 2 emissions; (ii) explicitly link CO 2 emissions with CO 2 concentrations, taking into account the coupled carbon cycle; (iii) quantify the emissions in terms of a cumulative target that turns out to be more robust than the time-dependent pathway, and (iv) use a 3D coupled carbon cycle model. This procedure allows an examination of the evolution of the coupled (1) show that to have a decent chance of stabilizing warming to Ͻ2°C above preindustrial, net carbon emissions (accumulated from the year 2000) must not exceed Ϸ590 PgC (1 PgC ϭ 1 ϫ 10 15 g of carbon, or equivalently 3.67 Pg of CO 2 ). This value is the median across a range of climate sensitivities and carbon feedback rates (see Fig. 1 ). Here, a ''decent'' chance is defined as P Ͼ 0.66, equivalent to ''likely'' in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) lexicon. Alarmingly, in the first 10 years since 2000, net carbon emissions will reach Ϸ100 PgC, approximately a sixth of the cumulative emissions budgeted for above. If policymakers seek even greater certainty to avoid crossing the 2°C threshold, say moving into the ''very likely'' range in IPCC lexicon (P ϭ 0.9), then it is estimated we need to cap post-2000 emissions at only 170 PgC. Assuming unmitigated greenhouse gas emissions over the next few years, we will exceed this cumulative quota as soon as 2017, which is a sobering metric in the lead-up to Copenhagen this year.
Zickfeld et al. (1) further show that the allowable cumulative emissions for a given stabilization target are robust to the chosen pathway toward stabilization. This finding agrees with three recent studies (10) (11) (12) , each exhibiting remarkably consistent cumulative emissions targets. What this result implies is that aiming for percentage reductions relative to a baseline year is not enough: cumulative emissions must also be capped. This is demonstrated in Fig. 1 , which shows six different emissions trajectories out to the year 2200, along with the corresponding cumulative emissions. Among the pathways shown are three scenarios (labeled 1-3) that are likely (P ϭ 0.66) to yield a long-term global warming of Ͻ2°C. Also shown is an emissions pathway (trajectory 4) that gives a very likely chance (P ϭ 0.9) of stabilizing warming at or below 2°C, an ambitious yet uncapped trajectory that sees cumulative emissions still growing by 2200, and a ''business-as-usual'' scenario that sees emissions not peaking until 2050 before gradually declining over the ensuing century. Curves 1-4 in Fig. 1 are based on the median values obtained by Zickfeld et al. (1), spanning a range of climate sensitivities and carbon feedback rates.
Apparent in scenarios 1-3 in Fig. 1 is the strong tradeoff between the date of peak emissions and the subsequent required rate of decarbonization of the economy. Put simply, if policymakers stall significant action for too long, then the required rate of decommissioning fossil fuel technologies shoots up. Apparent in scenario 5 is the need for urgent and sustained reduction strategies: in that case deep emissions reductions are achieved in the near term, but the phasing out of carbon-intensive technologies then progresses slowly, leading to the continued growth of net emissions beyond the end of this century. This scenario is unlikely to stabilize global warming Ͻ2°C.
Perhaps the most troubling of the scenarios is trajectory 4, which sees emissions plunge dramatically from today, capping at a mere 170 PgC of post-2000 emissions. According to the median estimates of Zickfeld et al. (1) , this cumulative emission yields a 90% chance of avoiding a 2°C warming. Although this task is daunting, indeed all but impossible, Article 2 of the UNFCCC suggests this goal should be firmly in the minds of policymakers. Unfortunately, the past 15 years of inaction has very real policy implications today.
There are, of course, uncertainties in the magnitude of carbon feedback and climate sensitivity, as also described by Zickfeld et al. (1) ; two examples are shown on the right side of Fig. 1 . These indicate the range of cumulative emissions allowable for the 66% and 90% likelihoods of avoiding 2°C warming. So, at the high end of carbon feedback and climate sensitivity, being 90% sure of avoiding the 2°C threshold would have required that emissions and landclearing ceased in the middle of the last century (Ϫ220 PgC). Today, this would require active removal of greenhouse gasses from the atmosphere. At the other extreme, taking the questionable risk of assuming very low climate sensitivity and carbon feedback, we still need to cap post-2000 emissions at only 700 PgC. This requires a peak in emissions within the next few decades followed by rapid decarbonization.
A global mean warming of 2°C could still have devastating impacts on climate (13), ecosystems, human health, and infrastructure. This level of warming, for example, is likely to significantly reduce food productivity over the tropics, substantially increase the risk of extinction for 20-30% of species worldwide, bleach most of the world's coral reefs, and increase the likelihood of severe weather and extreme climate events (14) . Global warming to Ϸ2.7°C could additionally trigger a gradual but irreversible disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, with still lower thresholds thought to apply to the Greenland Ice Sheet (15), ultimately raising sea level by Ͼ10 m and displacing hundreds of millions of people worldwide.
Two degrees Celsius warming should thus not be seen as a mere aspirational target: it surely has to be the maximum stabilization target for global warming, with recognition that even this carries significant global-scale risks. Worryingly, this once-modest target is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve, requiring deep emissions cuts over a confronting time frame, something that must be secured in Copenhagen this year.
